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Abstract: The use of contemporary technological achievements in combating and preventing 
criminality, especially when it comes to discovering it and ensuring evidence, is considered 
imperative in contemporary conditions. In this process the undertaking of certain actions, with the 
necessary use of means and technological methods, there may be a conflict with the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. In the public opinion, this is often interpreted as belonging to non-
democratic societies and states when there is an abuse of authorizations with the aim of placing 
control over their citizens. In this case, the fact that every criminal offense represents a violation of 
human rights and fundamental freedom is neglected, whereas contemporary crime, and especially the 
organized crime, infringe upon not only the basis of the society but also all rights and freedoms. 
Therefore, there should be no presumption as to whether prosecution bodies should use technological 
achievements in combating crime. The overall view of the European Court is that the state has a 
“positive obligation” to prevent and investigate criminal offenses and to criminally prosecute the 
offenders. The measures undertaken with the purpose of detecting and preventing such offenses and 
which interfere with the private life of the person are usually acceptable, provided they are provided 
by law and in conformity with the constitution and international standards which allow the limitation 
of freedoms and of human rights in indispensable cases. 
Keywords: Covert measures; human rights; interception; monitoring; controlled delivery; simulated 
purchase of an item 
 
1. Introduction 
Under contemporary conditions, covert and technical surveillance measures and 
investigation are considered as special means through which important facts can be 
ascertained and valuable material evidence can be obtained for the successful 
conduct of criminal proceedings. These measures, in accordance with paragraph 1 
of Article 84 of the Criminal Procedure Code, are enforced or required to be 
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enforced by the competent prosecutor and the pre-trial judge. Consequently, the 
state prosecutor or pre-trial judge is not required to have a reasonable suspicion on 
the identity of the suspect or suspect who has committed, are committing or 
will soon commit a criminal offense. (Criminal Procedure Code, 04/L-123, 
dated 13.12.2012, which entered into force on 01.01.2013). 
1.1. Covert and Technical Surveillance Measure and Investigation  
Under contemporary conditions, covert and technical surveillance measures and 
investigation are considered as having special weight through which important 
facts can be ascertained and valuable material evidence can be obtained for the 
successful conduct of criminal proceedings. (Prof. Azem Hajdari, Criminal 
Procedure Law – General Part, 2012, p. 160).  
The covert and technical surveillance measures and investigation are relatively new 
and the application of these measures is due to the social necessity for increasing 
the procedural efficiency in combating serious crimes, organized crime and 
corruption and as well as for the protection of the injured parties, witnesses and 
cooperative witnesses (Prof. Ejup Sahiti and Rexhep Murati, Criminal Procedure 
Law, Prishtina, 2013, p. 211). 
Organized crime strikes the highest ranked social values. In addition to this, the 
volume and the form of its appearance, as well as the linkage of organized crime 
with economic and political power holders make it difficult to recognize, detect 
and proving it and make it more dangerous than the danger caused by the worst 
classical offences. (Djurcic, V, Criminal Procedure Law, Special Part, Nis, 2006. p. 
242) 
The use of scientific and technological achievements in the prevention and 
combating of crimes is considered imperative in contemporary conditions. In the 
public opinion, this is often interpreted as an expression of non-democratic 
countries and societies, which abuse their powers in establishing control of the 
private life of their citizens. (Simović, M: Criminal procedural law, Bihać 2009, p. 
448). 
Communication via telephone and other means of telecommunication is a right of 
the individual to communicate freely, with all forms and tools of this technology, 
such as telephone conversations, faxes, telegrams, e-mails, etc. Any unlawful 
interference that violates this right by anyone, is an arbitrary act which is punitive. 
(Criminal Procedure, Commentary, Group of Authors, Tirana, 2003, p. 280). 
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Special observation is the criminal-tactical action of secret collection of 
information through the usage of the method of personal perception. This 
observation relates to the secret surveillance, supervision and interception of 
certain persons, vehicles, facilities and premises or spaces for the purpose of 
obtaining the appearance and gathering of information about the criminal state, 
activity and identification of those who are surveilled. (Criminology, Nedzat 
Korajlic and Driton Muharremi, Prishtina, 2009, p. 156). 
 
2. Covert and Technical Surveillance Measures and Investigation - 
Notion and Legal Basis for Applying These Measures 
Covert or technical surveillance measures and investigation (“measures under this 
chapter”) means each of the following measures: covert photographic or video 
surveillance; covert monitoring of conversations; search of postal items; 
interception of telecommunications and use of an International Mobile Service 
Identification “IMSI” Catcher; interception of communications by a computer 
network; controlled delivery of postal items; use of tracking or positioning devices; 
a simulated purchase of an item; a simulation of a corruption offence; an 
undercover investigation; metering of telephone-calls; and disclosure of financial 
data. (Article 81 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo). 
 
3. Legal Basis for Applying these Measures According to Kosovo 
Legislation 
These procedural measures are of the new era and were not familiar with the 
former laws that were applied in Kosovo. Theses measure were for the first time 
foreseen with UNMIK Regulation No. 2002/6 on Covert Technical Surveillance 
Measures and Investigation. (UNMIK Regulation no. 2002/6). Then it was 
foreseen with the Provisional Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo (Kosovo 
Provisional Criminal Procedure Code, UNMIK/REG/2003/26, Article 339), and 
finally with the Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, 2012. (Criminal Procedure 
Code No. 04 / L-123, dated 13.12.2012, articles 85-100). 
According to the provisions of UNMIK Regulation 2002, the covert measures were 
ordered based on the request of the public prosecutor, by the investigative judge, 
since until 2004 in Kosovo the investigation was conducted by the investigative. 
(cited regulation). According to the Provisional Criminal Procedure Code, some of 
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these measures such as: covert photographic or video surveillance in public places; 
Covert monitoring of conversations in public places; Covert investigation or 
interception of telecommunications were ordered by the public prosecutor, while 
the other measures were ordered by the pre-trial judge. (Cited the Provisional 
Code). According to the present Criminal Procedure Code of Kosovo, all of the 
measures from this chapter before the investigation can be ordered may be ordered 
by the state prosecutor, while after the initiation of the investigation it is the pre-
trial judge (Cited the Criminal Procedure Code). 
 
4. Covert Measures According to the Legislation in Some Countries in 
the Region 
4.1. Republic of Albania 
Republic of Albania, these measures has foreseen in Article 222 and has named 
them “interception” according to Article 222. par. 1. Upon the request of the 
prosecutor or the damaged party, the court authorizes interception following a 
reasoned decision for cases permitted by law when it is necessary for the 
continuation of the investigations initiated and when there is sufficient evidence to 
substantiate the indictment. When there are reasonable grounds for thinking that 
the delay may result in a serious endangering of the investigation, the prosecutor 
decides for the interception with a reasoned decision and notifies the court 
immediately, but no later than twenty-four hours. The court within 40 hours from 
the decision of the prosecutor makes the validation by a reasoned decision. When 
the validation is not done within the set time limit, the interception can not 
continue and its results can not be used. (Criminal Code of the Republic of 
Albania, Article 222. par. 1 and 2, of 2013). 
4.2. Republic of Croatia 
Republic of Croatia, this issue has regulated with the provision of Article 332 
which states: “If it turns out that the data on the criminal offense cannot be applied 
in any other way or would have been possible but with great difficulty, upon a 
reasoned and written request of the state prosecutor, the investigative judge may 
against the person for whom there is a based suspicion that he or she has 
committed the criminal offense foreseen in Article 334, may order special 
procedural actions which temporarily limit the constitutional rights of the citizens. 
(Croatia's Criminal Procedure Code of year 2017, Article 332. par. 1). 
Exceptionally, if there is a risk of deferral and if the state prosecutor has reason to 
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believe that he will not be able to secure the order from the investigative judge in 
time, the order from paragraph 1. within 24 hours can be issued by the state 
prosecutor and shall be delivered to the investigative judge within eight (8) hours. 
(Cited the Code, Article 332. par. 2 and 4). 
4.3. Republic of Montenegro 
Republic of Montenegro, the issue of these measures has foreseen in chapter nine, 
in Article 157 and has named them as “secret surveillance measures” and 
according to this article “if there is a grounded suspicion that any person alone or 
in co-operation with others have committed, is committing or are preparing to 
commit the criminal offense under Article 158 of the LP of Montenegro, while 
with other means evidence can not be ensured or their ensurance would constitute 
an unacceptable risk or risk for the life of these people, against these persons can 
be applied secret surveillance measures (Criminal Law of Montenegro, 2009, 
Article 157. par. 1). According to Article 159 of the Criminal Law of Montenegro, 
such measures are ordered by the investigative judge with the justified request of 
the state prosecutor, while some of the measures from Article 157. par. 2 are 
ordered by the public prosecutor. (Cited the law, Article 159). 
4.4. Republic of Macedonia 
According to Article 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Macedonia, these 
measures have been named as “special investigative measures” and according to 
this article “when it is probable that the ensurance of certain data and evidence is 
necessary for the successful conduct of criminal proceedings and otherwise can not 
be provided for, special investigative measures may be applied. (Criminal 
Procedure Code of Macedonia, of 2010, Article 252). 
The measures provided for in Article 252. par. 1, point 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the CRPM, 
upon the justified request of the public prosecutor are decided by the pre-trial judge with 
a written order, while those from point 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, of the said article shall 
be decided by the public prosecutor with a written order. (Cited Code, Article 256. par. 
1). 
4.5. Republic of Serbia  
Republic of Serbia, the issue of these measures has foreseen in Article 161 and has 
named them as “Special proving acts” and according to this Article “if there is a 
grounded suspicion that a person himself or in cooperation with others has 
committed the criminal offense under Article 162 of the Criminal Code of Serbia, 
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while no other means can be used for ensuring the evidence or their ensurance 
would be difficult. Special proving acts can be exceptionally also used against the 
person for whom there is a grounded suspicion that he is preparing any of the 
offenses under Article 162. par. 1. whereas the circumstances of the concrete case 
show that the offense can not be detected, hindered or proved or would cause 
unreasonable difficulties or great danger. (Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, 
2012, Article 161). In addition to the order for the control of remittances and the 
controlled delivery of remittances is given by the public prosecutor, while for the 
other measures the order is given by the pre-trial judge. (Cited Law, Articles 161-
182). 
4.6. Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Chapter IX has named these measures 
in Article 116 as “special investigative measures and conditions for the 
implementation of these measures.” Under this article, against a person for whom 
there is a grounded suspicion that a person himself or with other persons have 
participated in or participates in the commitment of criminal offenses under Article 
117 of this Law may be decided special investigative actions, if evidence can not 
otherwise be ensured or their ensurance is subject to incalculable difficulties. (Law 
on Criminal Procedure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 116). 
The measures referred to in Article 116 paragraph 2 shall be decided with the order 
of the pre-trial judge upon a reasoned proposal of the prosecutor. Exceptionally, if 
the written order can not be ensured on time and if there is a risk of deferral, the 
implementation of the measures referred to in Article 116 of this law can be 
decided upon even on the basis of an oral order of the pre-trial judge. The written 
order of the pre-trial judge must be ensured within 24 hours from the issuance of 
the oral order. (Cited Law, Article 118 (1) and (2)). 
If a comparison is done with the Kosovo legislation and legislation of the countries 
of the region, it results that the Kosovo Criminal Procedure Code allows the 
possibility of implementing these measures without any limitation before the 
commencement of the investigation. 
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5. Restricting the Human Rights and Freedoms According to the 
Constitution and International Instruments 
The European Union's practice allows the prosecutor to issue provisional orders for 
any of these measures, if then the court confirms that order within a short period of 
time (Jon Smibert, Guide for CPCK, 2013, p. 50). 
Intercepting telephone calls and tracking other communications is undoubtedly 
sanctioned under Article 17 of the Political and Civil Rights Agreement (PCRA) 
and Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but often 
the interference can be legitimate according to the criteria of Article 8 (2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (Gudmundur Alfredsson and Asbjorn 
Eide, translated by Nasire Bala-Rizaj and Naim Osmani p. 262). 
The court may take a decision to reject the right to the secrecy of letters, telephone 
conversations and other means of communication only if there are reasons which 
are expressly provided in the Constitution, such as: 1. If it is necessary for the 
conduct of criminal proceedings; 2. If such denial is necessary for the protection of 
the site, in the manner provided by law. (Prof. Dr. Enver Hasani and Prof. Dr. Ivan 
Čukalović, Commentary of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, p. 127.)”. 
In any case, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (also national courts 
and other state bodies) must take into account the balance between the individual's 
right that his “personal world” is protected from interference of the state, but also 
the court's right to objectively evaluate this sphere and to prevent the misuse of the 
right to privacy, namely the use of these rights in violation of the purpose of their 
constitution (Mladen Vukčević, Commentary of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Montenegro, 2015, p. 134). 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his apartment and 
his correspondence. The public authority may not interfere in the exercise of this 
right except in the extent provided for by law and, where necessary, in a 
democratic society, in the interests of public security, public order, health or morals 
or for the protection of the rights (Article 8 of the ECHR). 
In conclusion, special investigative methods needs always special attention 
especially in relation to the Human Rights and Freedoms. The European Court of 
Human Rights has recognised that there is a need for authorities to have recourse to 
special investigative methods for fighting organised crime and corruption cases. 
The use of special investigative methods does not in itself infringe for example the 
right to a fair trial but the use of special investigative methods must be kept within 
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clear limits. This is so because the rise of organised crime and its development 
requires the States to take appropriate measures. However, the use of these 
measures can be acceptable only if adequate and sufficient safeguards against 
abuse are in place, in particular a clear and foreseeable procedure for authorising, 
implementing and supervising the investigative measures in question. (Case 
Ramanuskas v. Lithuania, Application no. 74420/01, Judgment of 5 February 2008, 
Guide on Article 6 of the Convention – Right to a fair trial (criminal limb), Nuala 
Mole and Catharina Harby, The right to a fair trial – A guide to the implementation 
of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Belgium 2006) 
 
6. Each of the Covert Measures Individually 
6.1. Covert photographic surveillance 
The term “covert photographic or video surveillance” means the monitoring, 
observing, or recording of persons, their movements or their other activities by a 
duly authorized police officer by means of photographic or video devices, without 
the knowledge or consent of at least one of the persons subject to the measure. 
6.2. Covert monitoring of conversations 
The term “covert monitoring of conversations” means the monitoring, recording, 
or transcribing of conversations by a duly authorized police officer by technical 
means without the knowledge or consent of at least one of the persons subject to 
the measure. 
6.3. Search of postal items 
The term “search of postal items” means the search by a duly authorized police 
officer of letters and other postal items which may include the use of X-ray 
equipment. 
6.4. Interception of telecommunications 
The term “Interception of telecommunications” means the interception of voice 
communications, text communications or other communications through the fixed 
or mobile telephone networks. This shall include any similar technological device 
or system that carries information that is normally intended to be private. 
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6.5. Controlled delivery of postal items 
The term “controlled delivery of postal items” means the delivery by a duly 
authorized police officer of letters and other postal materials. 
6.6. Use of Tracking or Positioning Devices 
The term “use of tracking or positioning devices” means the use by a duly 
authorized police officer of devices, which identify the location of the person or 
object to whom it is attached. 
6.7. Simulated purchase of an item 
The term “a simulated purchase of an item” means an act of buying from a person 
suspected of having committed a criminal offence an item which may serve as 
evidence in criminal proceedings or a person suspected to be a victim of the 
criminal offence of Trafficking in Persons, as defined in Article 170 of the 
Criminal Code. 
6.8. Simulation of a Corruption Offence 
The term “a simulation of a corruption offence” means an act, which is the same 
as a criminal offence related to corruption, except that it has been performed for the 
purpose of collecting information and evidence in a criminal investigation. 
6.9. Undercover Investigation  
The term “an undercover investigation” means the planned interaction of a duly 
authorized police officer or cooperative agent of the prosecution who is not 
identifiable as a duly authorized police officer or of a person acting under the 
supervision of a duly authorized police officer with persons suspected of having 
committed a criminal offence. 
6.10. Metering of Telephone Calls 
The term “metering of telephone calls” means obtaining a record of telephone calls 
made from a given telephone number. 
6.11. Disclosure of Financial Data 
The term “disclosure of financial data” means obtaining information from a bank 
or another financial institution on deposits, accounts or transactions. (Cited Article 
81, paragraph 2-10 of CPCK). 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                     Vol. 15, no. 3/2019 
 50 
7. Covert and Technical Surveillance Measures and Investigation 
Ordered by the State Prosecutor 
The new Criminal Procedure Code, with the provisions of Article 84, has 
authorized the state prosecutor in certain situations to authorize each of the cover 
measures in accordance with Article 86-100 of this Code without the formal 
investigation against certain persons or identified persons being initiated, but also 
against unidentified persons when there is a suspicion that an offense will be 
committed in the future (not performed, is not being carried out), (Article 84 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code). 
The Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, when dealing with any of such 
measures, may be authorized only upon the order of an authorized judge of the 
Supreme Court by the President of the Supreme Court, but the evidence provided 
by these measures does not have an effect in the criminal proceedings (not 
admissible evidence) (Cited Article 28 of the Code). 
 
8. Covert and Technical Surveillance Measures and Investigation Prior 
the Criminal Proceedings 
Covert and technical surveillance measures and investigation may be authorized in 
accordance with Article 84 of the CPCK after the commencement of the criminal 
proceedings or at the same time as the state prosecutor's decision to initiate the 
preliminary procedure, the state prosecutor may require the pre-trial judge to 
authorize each of the covert or technical investigative measures in accordance with 
Articles 86-100 of this Code (Article 86, paragraph 2 of CPCK). 
 
9. The Authorization of the Prosecutor to order the Covert Measures Also 
after the Investigative Procedure has been initiated in Emergency Cases 
9.1. Evaluation of the Lawfulness of the Provisional Order of the Prosecutor  
The judge, before confirming this order of the judge, ex officio assesses its legality, 
i.e. whether legal conditions have been met that the prosecutor should give an order 
for the implementation of such a measure - whether it is a criminal offense and 
there is a danger for the damage to the investigation or the life and security of the 
injured party, witness, informant or members of their family, if the legal conditions 
are not met, the judge is likely not to confirm this order, in which case the order 
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will remain ineffective (evidence provided by this order would be inadmissible 
evidence). If the judge evaluates that in the present case all the legal conditions for 
such an order existed, he would confirm the order, whereby the evidence provided 
by the covert measure ordered by the prosecutor will be legitimate for the criminal 
proceedings if criminal proceedings are initiated (Article 91, paragraph 2 of the 
CPCK). 
 
10. Exceeding the Order for COvert and Technical Surveillance 
Measures and Investigation 
The state prosecutor or competent judge may issue another written order for the 
extension of the order if the preconditions for ordering a measure continue to be 
valid and there is a reasonable explanation for failing to provide some or all of the 
information sought under the previous order. The order may be extended to a 
maximum of sixty (60) days, which may be renewed within a period of three 
hundred sixty (360) days from the date of issuance of the order. The order for 
covert photographic or video surveillance in private places or interception of 
telecommunications can be extended up to sixty (60) days, but can be renewed for 
another sixty (60) days. The continuation of an order for a measure ordered by a 
pre-trial judge may be ordered only upon the proposal of the state prosecutor 
(Article 94 (2) and (3) of the CPCK). 
 
11. Admissibility of Evidence Obtained through Orders for Covert and 
Technical Surveillance Measures and Investigation 
The evidence obtained through the measure from this chapter are inadmissible if 
the order for the measure and its implementation is unlawful. (Article 97 paragraph 
2 of the CPCK). 
 
12. Rights of Subjects of Orders 
The state prosecutor shall promptly inform in writing by registered mail each 
subject of an order pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article that he or she has been 
the subject of that order and has a right to file a suit to the competent court within 
six (6) months of being informed. (Article 96. par. 9 of the CPCK). 
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According to the provisions of the CPCK, persons who were subject to these 
measures could initiate proceedings before the competent court for the legality of 
these measures. When reviewing the appeal, the panel should be provided with oral 
documents and statements. When the Surveillance and Investigation Review Panel 
finds that the measure is unlawful or the order for such measure is unlawful, it may 
decide that: a) to cease the order if it is still in force; b) order the disposal of 
collected materials; and (c) compensate the person or persons subject to the order 
(Article 96 of the CPCK). 
 
13. Conclusions 
Despite the fact that in the drafting of the Criminal Code of Procedure of Kosovo 
of 2012, apart from local experts, experts from the Council of Europe and experts 
from the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms have also participated, 
unfortunately I consider that this Code, in the chapter regulating the issue of the 
application of the covert and technical measures of surveillance and investigation, 
is in conflict with the standards that regulate this field, because it permits without 
limitation the application of these measures even without reasonable suspicion, 
without knowing the identity of the person even if these information can be secured 
in another way, then all these measures can be ordered by the state prosecutor 
before the investigation is initiated, and that such a possibility does not exist in any 
of the analyzed laws of the region, but which has the support in international 
instruments. The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms contains strict rules on the possible limitation of private life, provided 
that the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention are fulfilled. 
Accordingly, the temporary restriction of these rights to citizens is only possible if 
they meet the following conditions: 1. if other measures can not achieve the same 
purpose; 2. if there is a grounded suspicion that a person or other persons 
participated in or participated in the commission of criminal offenses, 3. if the 
order was issued by a court which retains the right to control the legality of these 
measures, while the prosecutor may only issue temporary orders in emergency 
situations, which should be confirmed by the court. 
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